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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 930494-CA 
v. 
DENNIS ANDRE TEIPEL, : Category No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from convictions for burglary, a third 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1990), 
and unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5 (1990), in 
the Third District Court in and for Salt Lake County, the 
Honorable Michael R. Murphy, presiding. This Court has 
jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2) (f) (Supp. 1994). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did defendant's trial counsel, who reasonably 
participated in the selection of the jury, render ineffective 
assistance of counsel by not challenging a juror who appears, on 
the written record, to have responded ambiguously to the trial 
court's voir dire about whether the juror could act impartially 
and fairly? Whether a defendant has received ineffective 
assistance of counsel is reviewed as a question of law when 
raised for the first time on direct review, State v. Tennyson, 
850 P.2d 461, 466 (Utah App, 1993); however, "appellate review of 
counsel's performance must be highly deferential." Id. at 466. 
2. Did the trial court correctly refuse defendant's request 
for a lesser included offense instruction on criminal trespass? 
Because a trial court's decision to refuse a jury instruction 
presents a question of law, the appellate court reviews that 
decision for correctness without affording it any particular 
deference. State v. Jaimez, 817 P.2d 822, 826 (Utah App. 1991); 
State v. Singh, 819 P.2d 356, 360 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied, 
823 P.2d 476 (Utah 1992). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
United States Constitution 
AMENDMENT VI 
In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall 
enjoy the right . . . to have the assistance of counsel 
for his defence. 
Utah Code Ann. (1990) 
§ 58-37a-5. Unlawful acts. 
(1) It is unlawful for any person to use, or to 
possess with intent to use, drug paraphernalia to 
plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, 
manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process, 
prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack, store, contain, 
conceal, inject, ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce 
a controlled substance into the human body in violation 
of this chapter. Any person who violates this 
subsection is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
§ 76-1-402. Separate offenses arising out of 
single criminal episode - Included offenses. 
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense 
included in the offense charged but may not be 
convicted of both the offense charged and the included 
offense. An offense is so included when: 
(a) It is established by proof of the same or 
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less than all the facts required to establish the 
commission of the offense charged; or 
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, 
conspiracy, or form of preparation to commit the 
offense charged or an offense otherwise included 
therein; or 
(c) It is specifically designated by a statute as 
a lesser included offense. 
(4) The court shall not be obligated to charge the 
jury with respect to an included offense unless there 
is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the 
defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of 
the included offense. 
(5) If the district court on motion after verdict or 
judgment, or an appellate court on appeal or 
certiorari, shall determine that there is insufficient 
evidence to support a conviction for the offense 
charged but that there is sufficient evidence to 
support a conviction for an included offense and the 
trier of fact necessarily found every fact required for 
conviction of that included offense, the verdict or 
judgment of conviction may be set aside or reversed and 
a judgment of conviction entered for the included 
offense, without necessity of a new trial, if such 
relief is sought by the defendant. 
§ 76-6-202. Burglary* 
(1) A person is guilty of burglary if he enters or 
remains unlawfully in a building or any portion of a 
building with intent to commit a felony or theft or 
commit an assault on any person. 
(2) Burglary is a felony of the third degree 
unless it was committed in a dwelling, in which event 
it is a felony of the second degree. 
§ 76-6-206. Criminal trespass. 
(1) For purposes of this section "enter" means 
intrusion of the entire body. 
(2) A person is guilty of criminal trespass if, 
under circumstances not amounting to burglary as 
defined in Section 76-6-202, 76-6-203, or 76-6-204: 
(a) he enters or remains unlawfully on property 
and: 
(i) intends to cause annoyance or injury to any 
person or damage to any property, including the use of 
graffiti as defined in Subsection 78-11-20(2); 
(ii) intends to commit any crime, other than 
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theft or a felony; or 
(iii) is reckless as to whether his presence 
will cause fear for the safety of another; or 
(b) knowing his entry or presence is unlawful, he 
enters or remains on property as to which notice 
against entering is given by: 
(i) personal communication to the actor by the 
owner or someone with apparent authority to act for the 
owner; 
(ii) fencing or other enclosure obviously 
designed to exclude intruders; 
(iii) posting of signs reasonably likely to 
come to the attention of intruders. 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
Rule 23B. Motion to remand for determination of 
ineffective assistance of counsel. 
(a) Grounds for motion; time. A party to an appeal in 
a criminal case may move the court to remand the case 
to the trial court for the purpose of entering findings 
of fact relevant to a claim of ineffective assistance 
of counsel. The motion shall be available only upon an 
allegation of facts constituting ineffective assistance 
of counsel not fully appearing in the record on appeal. 
The motion shall be filed prior to the filing of the 
appellant's brief. Upon a showing of good cause, the 
court may permit a motion to be filed after the filing 
of the appellant's brief. In no event shall the court 
permit a motion to be filed after oral argument. 
Nothing in this rule shall prohibit the court from 
remanding the case under this rule on its own motion at 
any time if the claim has been raised and the motion 
would have been available to a party. 
(b) Content of motion; response; reply. The content 
of the motion shall conform to the requirements of Rule 
23. The motion shall include or be accompanied by 
affidavits alleging facts not fully appearing in the 
record on appeal that show the claimed deficient 
performance of the attorney. The affidavits shall also 
allege facts that show the claimed prejudice suffered 
by the appellant as a result of the claimed deficient 
performance. A response shall be filed within 20 days 
after the motion is filed. Any reply shall be filed 
within 10 days after the response is filed. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Dennis Teipel, was charged by information with 
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burglary, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-202 (1990), and unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia, 
a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5 
(1990) (R. 7). Following a jury trial, the defendant was 
convicted of both charges (R. 101-02). The trial court sentenced 
defendant to terms of from zero to five years and six months on 
each of the offenses, respectively, to be served consecutively. 
However, the trial court stayed the sentences and ordered 
defendant serve thirty-six months probation with conditions (R. 
106-08). Five months later defendant's probation was revoked as 
the result of a different burglary (R. 119, 132-35). 
Defendant was initially represented on appeal by Ken Brown, 
who filed a brief (Appellant's Br.#l) claiming only that 
defendant was denied effective assistance because his trial 
counsel failed to challenge a juror for cause. Thereafter, 
present counsel was substituted (see district court's minute 
entry of December 19, 1994, unpaginated and attached at the end 
of the district court's record), and he filed a supplemental 
brief (Appellant's Br.#2) claiming the trial court erred in 
refusing defendant's request for a lesser included offense. This 
brief is responsive to both claims. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On the morning of March 14, 1993, Salt Lake City Police 
Officer David Harris was informed of a broken glass door at Big 
John's Texaco, located at 830 South State Street in Salt Lake 
City (R. 224-25) . Having gone to Big John's and verified that 
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the door glass was broken out, Officer Harris called for 
assistance (R. 226) . As he then looked through the store's front 
windows, he saw an interior office door open, close, open, and 
close again (R. 228) . After two other officers arrived, Harris 
and the others entered Big John's, forced their way through the 
then-locked office door, and found the defendant hiding in a 
closet behind the door (R. 229, 236-37). While arresting him, 
they discovered that he was carrying a syringe and a spoon (R. 
234, 253-55)• Salt Lake Police Detective Gordon Parks testified 
that defendant later told him that "he wanted to get something to 
eat, and so he went ahead and went in the door and was going to 
get some food to eat" (R. 286-87), although no food was found on 
defendant (R. 244). The officers also found an oily shoeprint 
matching defendant's outside a door whose screen had been pried 
up (R. 234, 238). 
Pepsi products, beef jerky, nuts, sandwiches, batteries, and 
flashlights were missing from the front area of the store (R. 
270, 277, 279) . Missing from the office area were a container of 
prescription drugs belonging to the owner, some postage stamps, 
and some packets of coffee (R. 280-81). None of the missing 
items were recovered (R. 279). 
The inside of the premises was in disarray: plastic bags 
lay on the floor by the drink cooler and in the office sink (R. 
231-32), the office garbage can had been emptied on the floor (R. 
232), and the office desk's drawers had been pulled out (R. 256). 
Owner Gerald Bruin left the premises locked and entirely in order 
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the night before (R. 271-72, 274-75). The store was not open 
that day, and no one had permission to enter (R. 268, 273). 
Defendant testified that he entered Big John's through the 
already-broken window in order to shoot up with cocaine and that 
he neither intended to nor actually picked up anything while 
inside (R. 296-99) . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
The standard for showing ineffective assistance of counsel 
in failing to challenge an individual juror is whether trial 
counsel reasonably participated in the jury selection process. 
The record in this case discloses that trial counsel reasonably 
participated in jury selection: he twice expressly passed the 
panel for cause, struck four potential jurors by peremptory 
challenge, and stipulated that five other potential jurors be 
excused. Defendant's ineffectiveness challenge must therefore 
fail. In addition, the record is ambiguous as to whether the 
juror which defendant objects to under his ineffectiveness claim 
was in fact biased. Therefore, defendant's ineffectiveness claim 
also must fail for failure to demonstrate prejudice. 
POINT II 
A defendant is entitled to a lesser included offense 
instruction only when the evidence establishes a rational basis 
for acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and 
convicting him of the included offense. State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 
152, 158-59 (Utah 1983). As in Baker, defendant has failed to 
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adduce any evidence, other than his unlawful entering and 
remaining in the building, to show that he could have been 
convicted of criminal trespass. Defendant's resort to the corpus 
delicti rule to attack the prosecution's argument against giving 
the lesser included offense instruction fails because it was not 
preserved and it does not apply to the facts of this case. The 
appellate court should not enter a conviction for criminal 
trespass because, under Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(5), not only is 
the evidence sufficient to convict defendant of burglary, but it 
is insufficient to convict him of criminal trespass. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
BECAUSE DEFENSE COUNSEL REASONABLY 
PARTICIPATED IN JURY SELECTION, DEFENSE 
COUNSEL'S DECLINING TO STRIKE ONE PARTICULAR 
PANEL MEMBER DID NOT CONSTITUTE INEFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN VIOLATION OF THE 
SIXTH AMENDMENT. 
Defendant's first assertion on appeal is that his trial 
counsel was ineffective in not striking prospective jury member 
John Killpack, who defendant claims "was clearly prejudiced 
against drug users."1 Appellant's Br#l. at 7. 
In considering an ineffectiveness of counsel claim raised 
for the first time on direct appeal, the standard of review 
applied by the appellate court is "whether defendant was deprived 
of effective assistance of counsel as a matter of law." State v. 
Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461, 466 (Utah App. 1993). However, even 
1
 The trial court's voir dire of the juror at issue (R. 
188-90) is attached at Addendum A. 
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though the court applies this usually nondeferential standard, 
"appellate review of counsel's performance must be highly 
deferential" to minimize the "temptation . . . to second-guess 
counsel's performance" in hindsight, "on the basis of an 
inanimate record." Id. at 466. 
Since ineffectiveness challenges normally cannot be raised 
on direct appeal, State v. Villarreal, 857 P.2d 949, 953 (Utah 
App. 1993), aff'd, 256 Utah Adv. Rep. 27 (Utah 1994), the Court 
is presented with the threshold question whether it can hear 
defendant's claim on this point. An appellant may bring an 
ineffectiveness claim on direct appeal if there is new counsel on 
appeal and "the trial record is adequate to permit determination 
of the issue." Id. at 953; State v. Humphries, 818 P.2d 1027, 
1029 (Utah 1991). A record is adequate when "[the appellate 
court is] not aware of any evidence or argument which might be 
made that is not now before [the court]." Id. at 1029. 
Defendant is represented by new counsel on appeal, and the record 
is adequate to evaluate defendant's claim. 
In order to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, defendant must show that counsel's performance was 
deficient by identifying specific acts or omissions which, under 
the circumstances of the particular case, demonstrate that 
"'counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness.'" State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 
1990) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 104 
S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984)). Second, defendant must establish the 
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prejudice prong by "affirmatively show[ing] that a reasonable 
probability exists that except for ineffective counsel, the 
result would have been different." State v. Lovell, 758 P.2d 
909, 913 (Utah 1988) . "Defendant has the burden of demonstrating 
that counsel's 'performance fell below an objective standard of 
reasonable professional judgment,' and that counsel's actions 
were not conscious trial strategy." State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 
170, 174 (Utah App. 1992). 
This Court recently addressed an ineffectiveness of counsel 
claim in the context of jury selection in State v. Cosev, 873 
P.2d 1177 (Utah App. 1994). In that case, the defendant asserted 
that his counsel was ineffective for not challenging a jury panel 
member who had worked as a diversion officer at both the Salt 
Lake City Police Department and the Salt Lake County Sheriff's 
Department, and whose statements the defendant said "clearly 
showed bias." Id. at 1179. However, the Court held that "absent 
some showing that trial counsel has failed to reasonably 
participate in the selection of jurors, . . . an ineffective 
assistance claim premised on the failure to challenge any 
particular juror for cause cannot 'overcome the strong 
presumption that trial counsel rendered adequate assistance and 
exercised reasonable professional judgment' in the selection 
process." Id. at 1180 (quoting State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 
159-60 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 497 U.S. 1024 (1990)). 
Underlying the "reasonable participation" standard 
established by the Cosey court was its recognition that its 
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"review of counsel's performance 'is inherently hampered by our 
necessary reliance on only the lifeless transcript to assess the 
dynamic and highly judgmental process of jury selection.'" 
Cosey, 873 P.2d at 1179-80. Unable to view in the cold record 
"demeanor or other intangible characteristics" of jurors, the 
court "could only speculate" about counsel's thoughts regarding 
any one potential juror, and ff[s]uch speculation is manifestly 
inappropriate, given the strong presumption that counsel's 
behavior was the product of trial strategy rather than 
ineptitude." Id. at 1179-80. See State v. Villarreal, 857 P.2d 
949, 954 (Utah App. 1993) (noting that counsel may have declined 
to challenge jurors because counsel believed that juror responses 
did not rise to level justifying for-cause challenge, or may have 
had some "other intangible reason for wanting them on the jury, 
such as attentiveness, education, or assertiveness"); Tennyson, 
850 P.2d at 468-69 (citing with approval cases finding 
ineffective assistance only when no conceivable legitimate tactic 
or strategy can be surmised from counsel's actions); State v. 
Garrett, 849 P.2d 578, 579-80 (Utah App. 1993) (same). 
The record in this case demonstrates that defense counsel 
reasonably participated in the jury selection process. Counsel 
twice expressly passed the jury panel for cause (R. 191, 200) . 
Defense counsel exercised all four of his peremptory challenges--
notably, one of the prospective jurors so stricken immediately 
followed Mr. Killpack on the jury list (R. 21). While it is 
impossible to know counsel's reasons for excluding these jurors, 
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there were plausible reasons for most of them: Ms. Wright had 
previously been a member of a jury which rendered a guilty 
verdict, and also had a brother-in-law who was a county sheriff 
(R. 167, 177); Ms. Newton had a neighbor who was a police officer 
(R. 178); several friends of Mr. Ketchum's were judges (R. 179), 
and his father's business had once been robbed (R. 175). 
Besides the peremptory challenges exercised by defense 
counsel, an additional five persons were excused from the jury 
panel pursuant to stipulation between counsel (R. 20, 200). 
While defense counsel and the prosecutor did not make express 
their reasons for excusing these panel members, for each there 
were reasons why defense counsel might not want them on the jury: 
Ms. Smith's father was a retired policeman who had been involved 
in similar kinds of cases (R. 173). Ms. Pesely and Ms. Jones 
taught many students who had been involved in the same type of 
cases and indicated they would have problems deciding the case in 
a fair and unbiased manner (R. 174, 176) . In response to a later 
question by the court whether they could decide the case without 
regard to preconceived notions, Ms. Pesely responded "I would 
hope that I could, but I'm not sure;" Ms. Jones said, "I don't 
think I could" (R. 181-82). While there was some indication that 
Michael Peck had been involved in drug abuse, he also explained 
that his grandfather died of alcohol poisoning (R. 190). 
Finally, Tracey Nelson was just one year out of high school, 
managed a pizza parlor (R. 153) and had recently been involved in 
a criminal proceeding against her father (R. 171). 
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Defense counsel thus acted affirmatively in the jury 
selection process, using peremptory challenges to remove jurors 
who he apparently did not feel could be challenged for cause, but 
whom he did not want on the jury. He also, together with the 
prosecution, excused a group of jurors each of whom possessed 
qualities competent defense counsel might strategically wish to 
avoid. He twice expressly passed the panel for cause. This 
record shows defense counsel to have reasonably participated in 
the jury selection process; therefore, defendant's 
ineffectiveness claim must fail under Cosey. 
Alternatively, this Court should deny defendant's 
ineffectiveness claim because the record simply does not disclose 
a clear prejudice or bias on the part of Mr. Killpack. As a 
result, the prejudice prong of Strickland has not been satisfied. 
Though defendant characterizes Mr. Killpack as "clearly 
prejudiced against drug users," Appellant's Br.#l at 7, the 
record is ambiguous as to what Mr. Killpack's feelings towards 
drug users were. While he initially indicated that he had 
"strong feelings"' that would make him unable to sit in judgment 
in a fair and unbiased manner (R. 188-89), he did not indicate 
whether those feelings would tend to favor or disfavor drug 
users. His description of an admired ex-uncle who "got involved 
with drugs" and whose "life [was] flushed," (R. 189), is as 
consistent with sympathy for the drug user's suffering as with 
prejudice against drug users in general. Furthermore, after the 
court clarified the context of the trial and asked a follow-up 
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question, Mr. Killpack unequivocally indicated that he could 
decide the case in a fair and unbiased manner (R. 189). 
The basis of defendant's challenge, however, concerns the 
end of the colloquy between the trial court and Mr. Killpack: 
THE COURT: . . . . Considering it from that 
perspective, could you set aside any feelings 
you might have and decide this case 
objectively and in a fair and unbiased 
manner? 
MR. KILLPACK: Yes. 
THE COURT: Do you think so? 
MR. KILLPACK: I would hope so. 
THE COURT: Are you sure? 
MR. KILLPACK: Not totally. 
THE COURT: All right. Anyone else? Ms. 
Huntsman? 
It is apparent that " [n]ot totally" does not signal any 
genuine doubt about being fair and impartial on the juror's part 
because if it did, the trial court would not have summarily 
discontinued the clarification process it was then engaged in. 
See Tennyson, 850 P.2d at 469 (refusal to challenge for cause or 
use a peremptory against a juror who said only that he could 
"probably" be fair to both sides was not ineffective, and citing 
with approval Pale v. State, 807 S.W.2d 538, 541-42 (Mo. App. 
1991), where juror in a rape case said he "[p]robably would" be 
able to set aside sister-in-law's rape, decision not to challenge 
was not ineffective assistance). Evidently the court--and 
defense counsel—were satisfied that Mr. Killpack's response 
merely indicated a normal hesitancy to give an absolute answer, 
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and that he could indeed be impartial. See State v. Brooks, 868 
P.2d 818, 822 (Utah App. 1994) ("The scope of the voir dire 
inquiry is left to the sound discretion of the trial court 
because only the trial court knows when it is satisfied that a 
prospective juror is impartial."). 
Even if this Court regards the juror's response as 
ambiguous, given the "strong presumption that trial counsel 
rendered adequate assistance and exercised reasonable 
professional judgment' in the selection process," Cosey, 873 P.2d 
at 1180, this Court should find that trial counsel's failure to 
challenge Mr. Killpack was not prejudicial to defendant as 
required by Strickland. 
In sum, the record in this case discloses that counsel 
reasonably participated in.jury selection. Defendant has not 
overcome the strong presumption that counsel rendered adequate 
assistance and exercised reasonable professional judgment, and 
his ineffectiveness claim must fail. Alternatively, the record 
does not show that the juror in question was in fact prejudiced 
to the extent that he could have been challenged for cause; 
therefore, the ineffectiveness claim should fail under the second 
prong of Strickland. 
Finally, even if this Court should determine that the record 
is not adequate to evaluate defense counsel's reasons for not 
challenging juror Killpack, his claim should still be rejected. 
See Garrett, 849 P.2d at 581-82 (rejecting claim of ineffective 
assistance where record found to be inadequate to rebut the 
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presumption that defense counsel rendered effective assistance). 
Considering defense counsel's participation in jury selection 
generally and the doubtfulness that the questioned juror's 
remarks signalled a prejudicial attitude against defendant, 
defendant has not overcome the presumption that his counsel's 
actions were not the result of conscious trial strategy. 
Moreover, defendant has not alleged facts outside the record in 
support of a remand under rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. See Garrett, 84 9 P.2d at 851 (holding that remand 
under rule 23B for a "fishing expedition" would be improper where 
the motion would not be available for lack of assertion of non-
record facts). 
In sum, on the ground that defendant has failed to 
demonstrate that his trial counsel's refusal to challenge juror 
Killpack constituted ineffective assistance, this Court should 
reject his claim. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S 
REQUEST FOR A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE 
INSTRUCTION BECAUSE THERE EXISTS NO EVIDENCE 
TO SUPPORT A CONVICTION FOR CRIMINAL TRESPASS 
Defendant claims that the trial court erred in denying his 
request for a lesser included offense instruction on criminal 
trespass, arguing that there was insufficient evidence of intent 
to commit a theft was insufficient and that there was evidence 
supporting his conviction for criminal trespass. 
Defendant's claim is disposed of under State v. Baker, the 
seminal case in Utah on the criteria for considering a lesser 
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included offense instruction. The trial court must first 
determine if the offense sought is a lesser included offense of 
the crime charged, that is, "whether the offense is established 
by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to 
establish the commission of the crime charged,ff State v. Baker, 
671 P.2d 152, 158 (Utah 1983) (citing Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-
402(3) (a)). If so, and "the evidence is ambiguous and 
susceptible to alternative explanations," the court must instruct 
on the lesser included offense if any one of the alternative 
interpretations provides both a rational basis for a verdict 
acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and convicting 
him of the included offense. Id. at 157-58. 
"This standard does not require the court to weigh the 
credibility of the evidence, a function reserved for the trier of 
fact." Id. at 159. The reviewing court analyzes the evidence 
and inferences to be drawn from it in a light most favorable to 
the defendant. State v. Velarde, 734 P.2d 449, 453 (Utah 1986). 
Notwithstanding this defense oriented standard, defendant's 
claim fails, as a'comparison with Baker demonstrates. In Baker, 
the defendant was found hiding inside a gas station which he had 
broken into. His defense was that due to intoxication he could 
not form the intent to steal; nonetheless, he was convicted of 
burglary. Id. at 159. The supreme court rejected his claim that 
he should have been given a lesser included offense instruction 
on criminal trespass because the defendant failed not only to 
introduce a "sufficient quantum of evidence" that he lacked the 
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intent to steal, but also because he did "not address the 
separate and distinct element necessary for criminal trespass." 
Id. at 160 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(4)). 
Defendant is guilty of the same error in this case. In 
support of his claim he cites a portion of the criminal trespass 
statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-206 (1990).2 Defendant's 
unlawful entering and remaining on the premises, an element of 
criminal trespass overlapping with burglary, is undisputed. 
However, the criminal trespass statute also requires a showing of 
(1) intent to either cause annoyance or injury, (2) intent to 
commit any crime other than a theft or a felony or (3) 
recklessness as to whether his presence cause fear for the safety 
of another. Neither at trial3 nor on appeal has defendant 
identified or argued any evidence of the necessary intent 
2
 Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-206 (1990), cited by defendant, 
provides: 
(2) A person is guilty of criminal 
trespass if, under circumstances not 
amounting to burglary as defined in Section 
76-6-202, 76-6-203, or 76-6-204: 
(a) he enters or remains unlawfully on 
property and: 
(i) intends to cause annoyance or 
injury to any person or damage to any 
property, including the use of graffiti as 
defined in Subsection 78-11-20(2); 
(ii) intends to commit any crime, 
other than theft or a felony; or 
(iii) is reckless as to whether his 
presence will cause fear for the safety of 
another[.] [Emphasis added.] 
3
 Argument on defendant's request for a lesser included 
offense instruction and the trial court's ruling (R. 325-28) is 
attached at Addendum B. 
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elements that would support his conviction for criminal trespass. 
Defendant acknowledges that he was guilty of something, 
Appellant's Br.#2 at 5, but he has simply failed to inform this 
Court of what that something is. For this reason alone his claim 
must fail. 
Neglecting this critical showing, defendant directs his 
challenge4 to attacking the prosecution's argument against the 
lesser included offense instruction, which was adopted by the 
trial court: Defendant claimed he entered the premises to shoot 
up with cocaine; however, it is a felony to possess or use 
cocaine.5 Therefore, a criminal trespass instruction was 
precluded by the statute (R. 325-26).6 On appeal, defendant 
argues that since the only independent evidence of his intent to 
commit the felony is his own statement, such evidence is 
unavailable under the corpus delicti rule, and therefore, the 
4
 Defendant also argues that the evidence of his intent to 
commit a theft was doubtful because there was no evidence that 
defendant had taken anything from the building. Appellant's 
Br.#2 at 3. However, defendant's presence on premises, which 
were indisputably broken into and from which property was 
indisputably stolen, is circumstantial evidence rebutting 
defendant's argument. Also, Detective Parks testified that 
defendant told him that he entered the premises to get something 
to eat (R. 286-87). 
5
 See Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-4(2)(b)(i)(D), -8(2)(a)(i), 
(b)(ii) (Supp. 1993) (collectively making use or possession of 
cocaine a third degree felony). 
6
 There are, of course, other grounds under the statute for 
establishing criminal trespass. However, the prosecution argued 
only a single ground for rejecting the requested instruction. 
Defendant did not argue alternative grounds or evidence to 
support his request in response to the prosecution's argument, 
through his testimony or in closing. 
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prosecution's argument should fail. This argument is misplaced 
for several reasons. 
First, defendant failed to preserve an argument based on the 
corpus delicti rule at trial. State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 359 
(Utah App. 1993) (defendant's failure to properly raise issue 
below waives appellate review).7 
Second, even if defendant's resort to the corpus delicti 
rule was well-taken, it would only nullify the prosecution's 
argument. It would not provide the missing element for criminal 
trespass, the fundamental flaw in his argument generally. 
Third, application of the corpus delicti rule does not serve 
defendant. Defendant correctly cites Utah caselaw for the 
proposition that "'[a]n admission or a confession, without some 
independent corroborative evidence of the corpus delicti, cannot 
alone support a guilty verdict.'" Appellant's Br.#2 at 4 (citing 
State v. Hansen, 857 P.2d 978, 980 (Utah App. 1993) (citation 
omitted)). Assuming, arguendo, that the State lacked such 
independent evidence, it would serve only to nullify the 
prosecution's argument. Again, it would not supply the missing 
element of intent to commit some offense other than a felony or a 
theft, necessary to convict defendant for criminal trespass. 
Moreover, the rule does not even apply to the prosecution's 
7
 Exceptions to the general rule of waiver allow reviewing 
courts to consider an issue for the first time on appeal if "the 
trial court committed plain error or the case involves 
exceptional circumstances." Brown, 856 P.2d at 359. Defendant 
does not argue either of these exceptions nor does the record 
support them. 
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use of it in this case. Provo City Corp. v. Spotts, 861 P.2d 
437, 441 (Utah App. 1993) ("'The purpose of the rule [is] to 
safeguard against convicting the innocent on the strength of 
false confessions.'") (citations omitted). The prosecution did 
not use defendant's statement as evidence to convict him of any 
offense. Defendant had not even been charged with possession of 
cocaine. Rather, the prosecution used it to defeat defendant's 
request for a lesser included offense instruction. Defendant has 
cited no case in which the corpus delicti rule would be 
applicable in such a circumstance. 
Finally, the corpus delicti rule is directed against the 
prosecution's use of uncorroborated statements. Provo City 
Corp., 861 P.2d at 441 ("Before a defendant's inculpatory 
statements can be introduced as evidence against defendant, the 
[prosecution] must prove the occurrence of a crime, i.e., a 
corpus delicti."). In this case, however, defendant introduced 
the incriminating statement. Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 
520 (Utah 1994) (finding that the defendant's use of statements 
at trial and objection to them on appeal an "inconsistency [that] 
smacks of invited error, which is 'procedurally unjustified and 
viewed with disfavor'") (citations omitted). 
Defendant concludes by requesting that this Court find there 
exists a rational basis for his conviction of criminal trespass 
and enter a conviction based on the insufficiency of evidence to 
establish defendant's intent to commit a theft. Appellant's 
Br.#2 at 6. 
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An appellate court may set aside a verdict and enter a 
judgment of conviction on the lesser offense if it determines 
that there is "insufficient evidence to support a conviction for 
the offense charged but that there is sufficient evidence to 
support a conviction for an included offense and the trier of 
fact necessarily found every fact required for conviction of that 
included offense . . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(5) (1995). 
Based on the foregoing argument, defendant has failed to 
meet the statutory requirements, and his request for relief 
should be denied. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing argument, defendant's convictions for 
burglary and unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia should be 
affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this St? day of April, 1995. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
"'KENNETH A. BRONSTON 
Assistant Attorney General 
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CLASSES ON CONTRACT AND CONSTRUCTION LAW. 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. ANYONE ELSE? MS. 
WINGERT? 
MS. WINGERT: I WAS A BUSINESS LAW CLASS ONCE. 
THE COURT: UP AT THE "U"? 
MS. WINGERT: NO. AT WEBER STATE. 
THE COURT: OKAY. MRS. HUNTSMAN, DID I SEE 
YOUR HAND UP? 
MS. HUNTSMAN: NO. 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. ANYONE ELSE? THE 
RECORD SHOULD INDICATE THERE IS NO FURTHER FURTHER 
FURTHER SHOWING OF HANDS. 
THE COURT: DO ANY OF YOU HAVE ANY MORAL, 
RELIGIOUS, PHILOSOPHICAL, OR OTHER REASONS THAT WOULD 
PROHIBIT YOU OR PREVENT YOU FROM SITTING IN JUDGEMENT OF 
ANOTHER PERSON? IF SO, INDICATE BY RAISING YOUR HAND. 
THE RECORD SHOULD INDICATE THERE IS NO SHOWING OF HANDS. 
AS I INDICATED TO YOU, ONE OF THE CHARGES IN 
THIS CASE, TO WHICH THE DEFENDANT HAS PLED NOT GUILTY AND 
FOR WHICH HE IS PRESUMED INNOCENT, IS THE UNLAWFUL 
POSSESSION OF DRUG -PERIPHRENALIA, A CLASS B. MISDEMEANOR. 
MR. KILLPACK: VERY STRONG FEELINGS. 
THE COURT: ABOUT THE POSSESSION OR USE OF 
DRUGS? 
MR. KILPACK: YES. 
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THE COURT: SUCH STRONG FEELINGS THAT WOULD 
CAUSE YOU TO BE UNABLE TO DECIDE A CASE WHERE CHARGES ARE 
MADE CONCERNING THOSE THINGS, CHARGES THAT ARE YET 
UNPROVED, OR FEELINGS THAT WOULD CAUSE YOU TO BE UNABLE 
TO SIT IN JUDGMENT IN A FAIR AND UNBIASED MANNER WHEN 
THOSE ARE THE KINDS OF CHARGES? IF SO, RAISE YOUR HAND. 
MR. KILLPACK, WHY IS THAT? 
MR. KILPACK: I HAD AN EX-UNCLE THAT WAS MY 
HERO, SO TO SAY, AND HE GOT INVOLVED WITH DRUGS. AND I 
SAW HIS LIFE BE FLUSHED. AND THAT COULD AFFECT MY 
JUDGMENT. 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. YOU TOLD US ABOUT THAT 
PERSONAL EXPERIENCE THEN? 
MR. KILPACK: RIGHT. 
THE COURT: WHAT WE HAVE IN THIS COURTROOM IS 
AN ENTIRELY DIFFERENT PERSONAL EXPERIENCE, DIFFERENT 
FACTS, DIFFERENT EVIDENCE. WE DON'T KNOW WHETHER THE 
CHARGE WILL BE PROVED OR NOT PROVED. 
CONSIDERING IT FROM THAT PERSPECTIVE, COULD YOU 
SET ASIDE ANY FEELINGS YOU MIGHT HAVE AND DECIDE THIS 
CASE OBJECTIVELY AND IN A FAIR AND UNBIASED MANNER? 
MR. KILPACK: YES. 
THE COURT: DO YOU THINK SO? _ 
MR. KILPACK: I WOULD HOPE SO. 
THE COURT: ARE YOU SURE? 
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1 MR. KILPACK: NOT TOTALLY. 
2 THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. ANYONE ELSE? MS. 
3 HUNTSMAN? 
4 I MS. HUNTSMAN: MY SISTER-IN-LAW DIED OF A DRUG 
5 OVERDOSE THIS TIME LAST YEAR. I DON'T KNOW IF THAT ~ 
6 THEY WERE PRESCRIPTION DRUGS. I DON'T KNOW IF THAT WOULD 
7 IN ANY WAY AFFECT — 
8 THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. AGAIN, YOU'RE 
9 DISCLOSING A PERSONAL EXPERIENCE, BAGGAGE THAT'S SIMILAR 
10 TO WHAT ALL OF US BRING INTO THE COURTROOM. COULD YOU 
11 SET THAT ASIDE AND NOT LET THAT AFFECT IN ANY WAY YOUR 
12 DECISIONS IN THIS CASE? 
13 MS. HUNTSMAN: YES. I THINK SO. 
14 THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. ANYONE ELSE? MR. 
15 PECK. 
16 MR. PECK: I HAVE BEEN DRUG— IN DRUG ABUSE, 
17 AND MY GRANDFATHER DIED OF ALCOHOL POISONING. THAT WOULD 
18 IMPAIR MY JUDGMENT TOWARD THAT PERIPHRENALIA CHARGE 
19 BROUGHT UP AGAINST HIM. 
20 THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. ANYONE ELSE? 
21 (NO RESPONSE) 
22 THE COURT: THE RECORD SHOULD INDICATE THERE 
23 IS NO FURTHER SHOWING OF HANDS. 
24 MR. PECK, YOU SAY IT WOULD NOT? 
25 MR. PECK: IT WOULD. 
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ADDENDUM B 
THE COURT: AND 27 THROUGH 40. SO WE ARE 
MTr;cTf,r,. W n i IJ0T r.IVK ANYTHING NUMBERED 23 THROUGH 26? 
MR. YBARRA: 
MR. ANDERSON: WE ADDED-- DO YOU HAVE A 27, 
•p 
THE COURT: T n ™ ' 




ALWAYS RIGHT TODAY. £ J « - MISSING . HROUGH 
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C O R R E C T Mb.1 C.i J l l.''I1 ./.  1. • r • t. I.. 11] S C U S i ! Ilk"! "'<' ^ h1'.."' F C» '.'• ElJ f E T 1.' 71 K 
COUNSEL " Tr UGHT THAT WE HAD A SET TO WHICH THERE WERE 
THEN r 
£i:r..E THERE ' :-'. EVIDENCE DMISSIC H-; 
THE INTEND V ^ A 
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BECAUSE THE FELONY STATUTE STATED ISJUNCTIVE 
"N I'fh "F Hu,L. fe t'SK l"N, TH YBARRA 
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1 NOT APPROPRIATE, AND THAT IS, HE HAD ALREADY COMMITTED 
2 THE CRIME IN QUESTION, THE FELONY, BY HIS POSSESSING IT, 
3 AND THE USE OF IT WAS MERELY A CONTINUUM OF THE CRIME 
4 THAT HE HAD ALREADY COMMITTED, AND HE CERTAINLY CAN'T BE 
5 PROSECUTED FOR ONE MORE THAN ONE CRIME FOR THAT. 
6 MR. YBARRA GOES ONE STEP FURTHER, THEN, AND 
7 SEEKS TO AMEND THE INFORMATION WHICH SPECIFICALLY 
8 FREMISES THE ELEMENT OF THE BURGLARY ON AN ENTRY WITH 
9 INTENT TO COMMIT A THEFT, RATHER THAN THE MORE 
10 GENERALIZED LANGUAGE OF INTENT TO COMMIT A FELONY. 
11 HE WISHES TO AMEND TO INCLUDE THE MORE GENERAL 
12 LANGUAGE OF INTENT TO COMMIT A FELONY OR COMMIT A THEFT. 
13 OR INTENT TO COMMIT A FELONY. 
14 MR. ANDERSON'S POSITION IS THAT TO DO SO WOULD 
15 BE PREJUDICIAL AT THIS POINT IN THE TRIAL; THAT IF THIS 
16 WAS DONE, THAT AMENDMENT WOULD HAVE HAD TO HAVE BEEN MADE 
17 BEFORE THE OPENING STATEMENT, IN WHICH MR. ANDERSON TAKES 
18 THE POSITION AND THEREAFTER PUTS ON EVIDENCE THAT HE WENT 
19 IN TO USE A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE. 
20 THOSE ARE THE ISSUES, AS I UNDERSTAND THEM. 
21 AND IF I HAVE NOT ARTICULATED THEM PROPERLY, FROM YOUR 
22 PERSPECTIVE— 
23 MR. YBARRA: I BELIEVE YOU HAVE PROPERLY 
24 ARTICULATED THAT. ONE MINOR THING FOR THE RECORD HERE, 
25 THAT IS, IS DEFINITION OF CRIMINAL TRESPASS 76-6-206 
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INDICATES THAT A PERSON I" OUT!.?" CF "FTMINAL TRESPASS 
1STANCES NOT AMOUNTING ' BURGLARY AS 
DEFINED . : . •• -.. r . IS 
PARTICULAR CASE WE BELIEVE TH* ' I • •"•!=. JUhi WERE TO 
' •: - ;••• ••". •" CTIONS AS HE'S 
T E S T I F I E D . ... WOULD AMOU; ;>l: Ku.iRGl 
•:: I :-.'•: :. :- * . . : „- :... - \ MATTE:- F LAV; IN 
DETERMINUii' WIIKTHIT IT1" APPROPRIATE TO GIVE A LESSER 
INCLUDED OF CRIMINAL TRESPASS. 
THE COURT: MR. ANDERSON, DO YOU NEED TO 
t:;uppLEM. 
:l \NDERSON: I BELIEVE YOU HAVE ACCUhA'mLi 
••\RACTERIZED ' OBJECTION. -.' : . MAKE IT CLEAR, 
-•ru.TPED 
OFFEICS: STATED ' FOR THE 
ROUNDS THAT REFER TO. 
COURT WAS. 
T AND THAT MR. YBARR; ~"SITIOH IS 
CORRECT ON LESSER HE 
LESSER-INCLUDED, BUT I U> )ENYING THE REQUEST TO AMEND 
ANGUAGJ • • GENERAL THAN 
SPECIFIC, FOR THE REASON STATEL 
AND THAT IT WOULD BE UNFAIR AND 
WOULD HAVE PRESENTED THE 
) 
CASE DIFFERENTLY AND PRESENTED A DIFFERENT THEORY OR 
PRESENTED NO THEORY. 
SO NOW, HAVING MADE THOSE OBJECTIONS, MR. 
ANDERSON, DO YOU HAVE ANY FURTHER OBJECTIONS TO THE 
INSTRUCTIONS? 
MR. ANDERSON: I DO NOT, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. MR. YBARRA, I MADE A 
RECORD THAT YOU WANT TO AMEND, AND I'M NOT ALLOWING THAT. 
MR. YBARRA: I HAVE NO OTHER OBJECTION. 
THE COURT: OKAY. CAN WE BRING THE JURY IN 
NOW AND INSTRUCT THEM, AND HAVE CLOSING STATEMENTS? 
MR. YBARRA: YES, YOUR HONOR. 
MR. ANDERSON: YES. 
THE COURT: I'LL READ FAST. LISTEN, I ASKED 
THEM IF THEY HAD MADE A TENTATIVE DECISION, AND THEY WANT 
TO COME BACK IN THE MORNING IF THEY GO PAST 5:15. SO 
THEY WANT TO COME BACK IN THE MORNING AS EARLY AS 
POSSIBLE. 
SO -- WELL JUST BRING THEM BACK, IF IT'S ALL 
RIGHT WITH YOU, WE'LL JUST HAVE THE BAILIFF SWORN IN 
TONIGHT, WE'LL INSTRUCT THEM NOT TO DISCUSS THE CASE, 
ACTUALLY GIVE THEM THE CAUTIONARY INSTRUCTION WITH THIS 
ELABORATION THAT YOU ARE TO SHOW UP HERE AT A TIME 
CERTAIN IN THE MORNING, YOU WILL AN ASSEMBLE OUT IN FRONT 
OF THE JURY ROOM, AND WHEN YOUR ALL ASSEMBLED, MR. 
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